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Abstract In ubiquitous environments where human users get to access diverse kinds
of (often multimedia enabled) services irrespective of where they are, the issue of secu-
rity is a major concern. Security in this setting encompasses both in the interest of the
human users as well as their information and objects that they own. A typical kind of
transaction interaction among users and/or machines in these environments is that of
exchanging digital objects via purchases and/or ownership transfers, e.g. someone buy-
ing a song from iTunes via his iPhone, or downloading either bought or rented movies
onto a portable DVD player. Here, there is a need to provide trustworthy protection of
the rights of both parties; i.e. the seller’s copyright needs to be protected against piracy,
while on the other hand it has been highlighted in literature the need to protect inno-
cent buyers from being framed. Indeed, if either party cannot be assured that his rights
are protected when he is involved in transactions within such environments, he would
shy away and instead prefer for instance the more conventional non-digital means of
buying and selling. And therefore without active participation from human users and
object owners it is difficult to fully kick off the actual realization of intelligent environ-
ments. Zhang et al. recently proposed a buyer-seller watermarking protocol without a
trusted third party based on secret sharing. While it is a nice idea to eliminate the need
of a trusted third party by distributing secret shares between the buyer and the seller
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2such that neither party has knowledge of the fingerprint embedded in a content, we
show that it is possible for a buyer to remove his part of the fingerprint from the content
he bought. This directly disproves the piracy tracing property claimed by the protocol.
In fact, since piracy tracing is one of the earliest security applications of watermarking
schemes, it raises doubts as to the soundness of the design of this protocol.
Keywords Security systems · trustworthy applications · content protection ·
transactions · digital rights protection · watermarking and fingerprinting protocol ·
buyer-seller · anonymity · unbinding property · secret sharing
1 Introduction
As users transact across virtual spaces within ubiquitous environments via their portable
mobile smart devices like handhelds, PDAs, iPhones etc., the consumer business model
has now moved to a setting where human consumers potentially purchase goods or
services anywhere as long as they have access to their personal smart devices. The
purchasing and subsequent downloading of songs (e.g. from iTunes), movies, music
videos, etc is now so simple and inexpensive that users inadvertently involve them-
selves in such digital transactions as a matter taken for granted. And so, we have the
situation where numerous amounts of digital content are bought and sold within this
environment. Naturally, security issues arise that need to be addressed properly and
trustworthily.
When a digital content is sold to a buyer B, there is a need to protect the seller’s
rights against cases where the buyer illegally redistributes copies of this content. There-
fore, watermarking protocols are typically used to embed buyer-specific watermarks
(a.k.a. fingerprints) into the content so that when an illegal copy is found, the ex-
tracted watermark reveals who the guilty buyer is.
However, it was not until [22] that the issue of protecting the buyer was raised.
This is now known as the customer’s rights problem. Briefly, this is caused by the
implicit assumption that sellers are fully trusted, but if a seller is malicious, he can
easily embed any buyer’s fingerprint into his content and frame an innocent buyer for
illegal distribution.
Building on this idea, [18] proposed the first of what is now a class of buyer-
seller watermarking (BSW) protocols [18], [14], [1], [9], [16], [25] based on privacy
homomorphic encryption schemes and watermarking schemes with linear embedding
functions, though the more recent two [16], [25] protocols have the explicit design
strategy such that they no longer require underlying watermarking schemes with the
linearity property. Interestingly however, it is the absence of this property that is the
starting point for our attack to work, as will be described in our Section III on protocol
analysis.
In particular, we show in this paper that for a recent variant of the buyer-seller
watermarking protocols, namely [25], it is possible for the buyer to remove his fin-
gerprint from his copy of the bought content. This therefore directly disproves the
piracy tracing property claimed by the protocol. In fact, since piracy tracing is one
of the earliest security applications of watermarking protocols, it raises doubts as to
the soundness of the design of this protocol.
32 Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocols
These are protocols that provide content distribution between a buyer and a seller, in
which the buyer of the content can be traced, while at the same time the seller cannot
frame an honest buyer of illegal content redistribution. In addition, a malicious buyer
cannot deny illegally redistributing content.
As mentioned earlier, BSW protocols were first proposed by [22] and later im-
proved by [18]. [14] presented a protocol that also protects the buyer’s privacy. Several
buyer-seller protocol variants have been constructed since then, including the proto-
cols proposed in [1], [2], [5], [6], [8], [9], [12], [13], [15], [16], [17], [21], and subsequent
analyses appear in [10], [11], [20], [24], [5, 4, 23].
2.1 Parties Involved
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves a seller (S), who provides (or sells) con-
tent to a buyer (B), while an arbiter (A) settles disputes between the seller and buyer.
A special trusted third party may also be involved. In many buyer-seller watermarking
protocols [18, 14, 16], this role is played by a watermark certification authority (WCA),
who is responsible for generating and certifying client watermarks. It is assumed that
the seller and the buyer do not trust each other. It is also assumed that WCA and A
will not conspire with the seller and/or the buyer.
2.2 Threats
The main security threats for BSW protocols can be classified from the perspective of
which is the malicious party:
– Seller. A seller may frame a buyer. This happens when a seller inserts a unique
watermark matching the buyer’s identity into copies of the content and distributes
this widely. Later the seller can accuse the buyer of illegal content redistribution
by extracting this watermark from these copies.
– Buyer. There are two main threats:
– A buyer may try to remove the watermark in the marked content.
– A buyer may redistribute copies of content given by the seller, and later deny
this fact when confronted by the seller.
2.3 Security Properties
These motivate the three main security properties of a buyer-seller watermarking pro-
tocol [14, 16]:
– Traceability. The identity of a legitimate, but dishonest, buyer who illegally re-
distributes content can be traced by the seller. This is the fundamental property
expected of watermarking protocols used for copyright protection.
– Framing Resistance. An honest buyer cannot be falsely accused of illegal redistri-
bution by the seller. This property relates to the customer’s rights problem which
motivated the introduction of BSW protocols.
4– Non-repudiation of Redistribution. A dishonest buyer who has redistributed illegal
copies of content cannot refute this fact. This allows the seller to prove the illegal
act of the buyer to a third party arbiter. In this case framing resistance is a pre-
requisite since, without this property, a buyer can claim that it was the seller who
redistributed copies of the content.
Some existing protocols [14, 16] include the protection of buyer’s privacy as an addi-
tional security property, but in this paper we will only focus on the three fundamental
properties.
2.4 Main Techniques
To fulfill the above mentioned security properties, the main idea is to prevent the
seller from being able to determine the final marked copy given to the buyer while still
allowing the seller to trace the identity of the buyer in illegally redistributed contents.
– For piracy tracing (traceability), BSW protocols deploy digital watermarking schemes
[3].
– For non-repudiation of redistribution, BSW protocols deploy digital signature schemes
such as RSA-OAEP to ensure that a dishonest client cannot repudiate the fact that
copies of content were illegally distributed.
– To prevent the seller from framing a buyer (framing-resistance), most BSW pro-
tocols deploy asymmetric homomorphic encryption schemes such as Paillier [19]
together with digital watermarking schemes such as the spread spectrum water-
marking scheme [3] in a way that the party (i.e. the seller) who embeds his share
of the watermark into the content has no idea what the final embedded watermark
is. This technique is termed as watermarking in the encrypted domain [7]. As for
who should generate the buyer watermark, there are two different techniques:
– In the first technique introduced by Memon and Wong [18], a special trusted
third party commonly known as the Watermark Certification Authority (WCA)
was introduced to generate buyer watermarks, instead of letting the distributor
to generate them; the WCA is fully trusted.
– In the second technique, which was deployed by [25], the buyers are tasked to
generate their own watermarks.
3 The Zhang et al. and Lei et al. Protocols
The [25] protocol basically inherits all the properties of its immediate predecessor
the [16] protocol, but in addition its design strategy is such that there are only two
parties involved, namely the buyer and the seller, and they do not need to interact with
any TTP (WCA in this case) during the buying-selling stage except if a dispute arises
later. The aim of this strategy is to eliminate the threat of conspiracy attacks [1, 9, 25].
Indeed, it is a major achievement to design a secure buyer-seller watermarking protocol
that does not require a TTP.
Both BSW protocols comprise three subprotocols; namely, the registration subpro-
tocol, the watermarking subprotocol and the identification and arbitration subprotocol.
However, only the registration subprotocol and the watermarking subprotocol, which
are relevant to the discussion in this paper are described. Note that the registration
5subprotocol for both BSW protocols are identical. For compactness of description, the
Zhang et al. watermarking subprotocol and Lei et al. watermarking subprotocol are
illustrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 1, respectively. The notations used are as defined in Table
1.
Table 1 Notations
S The seller who sells the digital content
B The buyer who can buy contents anonymously
WCA The watermark certification authority who can issue watermarks to buyers
upon request and certify them
CA Certification authority who can issue the (optionally anonymous) certifi-
cate and a pair of keys (pk, sk) for every party in the public-key infras-
tructure (PKI)
(pkI , skI) Public-private key-pair of user, I
(pk∗B , sk
∗
B) An anonymous one-time key-pair generated by B
SignskI (m) Signature of message, m signed by I with his private key, skI
EpkI (m) Ciphertext of message, m encrypted with I’s public key. Encryption can
be done by anyone
CertJ (I) Digital certificate issued to party I by certification authority J . Anyone is
able to verify the validity of the certificate, and the public key associated
with a particular party can be easily obtained from his certificate
X Original content with m elements, x1, x2, . . . , xm
W Watermark with n elements, w1, w2, . . . , wn, where n ≤ m
V Watermark for indexing with n elements, v1, v2, . . . , vn, where n ≤ m
X′, X′′ Watermarked content
X +W Embed W into X with the embedding operation, +
ARG An agreement which states the rights and obligations of seller and buyer,
and uniquely binds a particular content X. This is to solve the unbinding
problem in the original Memon-Wong BSW protocol [18], thus it can also
be treated as a purchase order
Buyer B Seller S WCA
CertCA(pkB), CertB(pk
∗
B),
ARG, Signsk∗
B
(ARG)
−−−−−−−−−− −→
CertB(pk
∗
B), ARG,
Signsk∗
B
(ARG), X′
−−−−−−−−−−−−−− −→
Epk∗
B
(W ), EpkWCA (W ), pk
∗
B ,
SignskWCA (Epk∗B
(W ), Signsk∗
B
(ARG))
←− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Epk∗
B
(X′′)
←− −−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 1 The Lei et al. Watermarking Subprotocol
6Buyer B Seller S
CertCA(pkB), CertB(pk
∗
B),
ARG,Epk∗
B
(SECB), Signsk∗
B
(Epk∗
B
(SECB), ARG)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− −→
Epk∗
B
(X′′)
←− −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Fig. 2 The Zhang et al. Watermarking Subprotocol
3.1 The Registration Subprotocol
The buyer, B firstly applies to CA for an anonymous certificate1 as follows:
1. B randomly generates an anonymous public-private key pair (pkB , skB). He then
sends pkB to CA.
2. Upon approval, CA computes the anonymous certificate CertCA(pkB) and replies
it to B.
Alternatively, if anonymity is not a concern, B can simply skip this subprotocol by
carrying out the transaction using his normal digital certificate.
3.2 The Lei et al. Watermarking Subprotocol
Fig. 1 visualizes Lei et al.’s watermarking subprotocol and the details are as follows:
1. Firstly, B negotiates with the seller, S anonymously using his anonymous identity
pkB , on the honor of CertCA(pkB).
2. After the negotiation, the buyer randomly generates an anonymous (one time)
public-private key pair (pk∗B , sk
∗
B) and sends CertCA(pkB), CertB(pk
∗
B), ARG and
signsk∗
B
[ARG] to the seller. Note that the buyer is using his anonymous identity
to generate the certificate CertB(pk
∗
B), hence the buyer’s identity is not shown in
the subject field.
3. Upon receiving the message from the buyer, the seller verifies the certificates
and signatures. If pass, she embeds her watermark V into the X that the buyer
wishes to purchase, and obtains X ′ = X + V . Then, she sends CertB(pk∗B), ARG,
signsk∗
B
[ARG] and X ′ to WCA.
4. After validating the message from the seller, the WCA generates a unique water-
mark W , especially for this transaction (best-suited for X ′) and encrypts it with
pkWCA and pk
∗
B . Note that the second encryption scheme has to be homomorphic
with respect to the +. Then, he sends EpkWCA [W ], Epk∗B [W ], signskWCA [Epk
∗
B
[W ],
pk∗B and signsk∗B [ARG]] back to the seller.
5. Due to homomorphic property, the seller is able to insert the second watermark
in encrypted form into Epk∗
B
[X ′] and obtains Epk∗
B
[X ′′], where X ′′ = X ′ + W ,
without knowing the sk∗B . Then, she delivers Epk∗B [X
′′] to the buyer and stores all
the necessary information in her database with respect to X.
6. Finally, the buyers receives his watermarked purchased content X ′′ by decrypting
the message received from the seller with his sk∗B .
1 An anonymous certificate is just like a normal digital certificate except that the subject
field contains a pseudonym but not the user’s identity.
73.3 The Zhang et al. Watermarking Subprotocol
Fig. 2 visualizes Zhang et al.’s watermarking subprotocol and the details are as follows:
1. Similar to the Lei et al. protocol, B negotiates with S anonymously to set up a
new ARG.
2. Then, B randomly generates an anonymous key pair (pk∗B , sk
∗
B) and a secret
SECB . He sends CertCA(pkB), CertB(pk
∗
B), ARG, Signsk∗B (Epk
∗
B
(SECB), ARG)
and Epk∗
B
(SECB), to the seller, S.
3. Upon receiving the message from B, then S checks the validity of the certificates
and signature. If they pass the verification, S generates a random unique first-round
watermark V and embeds it into the purchased digital multimedia content, X to
obtain the first-round watermarked content,X ′ = X+V . Then he generates a secret
SECS and computes the encrypted watermark Epk∗
B
(W ) where W (= SECS +
SECB) is the second-round watermark, using a public key cryptosystem which
is privacy homomorphism with respect to the embedding operating +. Thanks
to the homomorphism property, Epk∗
B
(W ) where W = SECS + SECB can be
obtained without decrypting Epk∗
B
(SECB); in fact, this can not be done by S as
he does not have the corresponding sk∗B . Again, by using homomorphic public key
cryptosystem, the seller can insert the second-round watermark W into X ′ in the
encrypted domain to obtain Epk∗
B
(X ′′). Then, S delivers Epk∗
B
(X ′′) to B and stores
the sales record for X.
4. Finally, with the knowledge of sk∗B , B can decrypt the received Epk∗B (X
′′) to ob-
tain the final watermarked content X ′′.
For more details of both protocols, we refer the reader to [16, 25].
4 Attacking the Zhang et al. Protocol
It was claimed by [25] in their Section 4 that in their protocol, a buyer, B is unable to
remove his fingerprint W from the copy X ′′ he had purchased. Hence, traceability (i.e.
piracy tracing) was claimed. To be precise, the argument is that since X ′′ = X ′+W =
X + V +W , therefore since both X and V are unknown to B and further that only
one share (out of two) of W is known to B, therefore B is not able to extract any
information on W . In general, one can only remove an embedded watermark W if one
knows the value of W .
Nevertheless, we show here that this can be circumvented for the Zhang et al.
protocol, i.e. a buyer can remove his fingerprint hence invalidating the piracy tracing
claim; and thus a dishonest buyer can then illegally redistribute the bought content.
The problem stems from the fact that both secret shares SECB and SECS are em-
bedded into the encrypted domain of X independently, and in the same way that
any individual independent watermark, e.g. V is embedded, thus X ′′ = X ′ + W =
X + V +W = X + V + SECS + SECB can be viewed as having been embedded with
3 independent watermarks V , SECS and SECB . To the best of our knowledge, no
other BSW protocol exhibits this. Therefore, with the knowledge of the value of any
of these 3 watermarks, that watermark can be removed. In the case of B, he knows
SECB , therefore he can remove SECB from X
′′ before illegally distributing it, thus
all traces of B can no longer be found in the pirated copy.
8In more detail, recall that a robust watermarking scheme is needed for the wa-
termark embedding and extraction, the most common one being [3] used by all BSW
variants to perform watermark embedding and extraction. This was also the one used
by Zhang et al. as a concrete example in their Section 3.
The scheme first performs DCT on the content to obtain a set of DCT coefficients,
which we denote as x1, x2, . . . , xm. Then a scaled version (let α be the scale factor) of
the watermark is added to the DCT coefficients based on three possible variants of an
insertion formula in [3]. For ease of description, we use the simplest one but we stress
that our attack applies regardless of which is used. Let W = w1, w2, . . . , wm, then
insertion of watermark W into the DCT coefficients x1, x2, . . . , xm of some content X
is:
x′i = xi + α · wi, (1)
where x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
m are the watermarked coefficients. In the case of the Zhang et al.
protocol, the coefficients of X ′′ are:
x′′i = xi + vi + α · wi = xi + vi + α · SECSi + α · SECBi . (2)
Therefore, B can remove traces of SECB from X
′′ by doing:
x′i = x
′′
i − α · SECBi = xi + vi + α · SECSi . (3)
Note that the same problem fundamentally exists in Zhang et al.’s immediate prede-
cessor [16]. Interestingly enough, this problem is a consequence of the design strategy
of not requiring the underlying watermarking scheme to be linear in contrast to most
existing buyer-seller protocol variants [18, 14, 1, 9]. By design, this relaxation relates to
not including a secret permutation σ applied onW , thereby the underlying watermark-
ing scheme need not be linear. Indeed, if the Zhang et al. protocol was designed with
such a σ applied more specifically on SECB prior to insertion, then it seems this attack
can be prevented. Yet, it was the non-requirement of linear underlying watermarking
schemes (thus non-inclusion of σ) that was the explicit design strategy of these two
protocols in the first place.
5 Discussion: Comparing the Security of Two Protocols
5.1 Resistance to Conspiracy Attacks
While the Zhang et al. protocol is based on the [16] protocol, yet in contrast, its design
strategy clearly avoids the conspiracy attacks [1, 9, 25] where two or more parties
involved in a protocol collude (conspire together) with each other to maliciously cheat
another innocent party outside the collusion set. This is because since there are only
two parties (the seller and the buyer) thus the notion of collusion becomes no longer
meaningful.
For the case of Lei et al. however, one could argue that if one considers a setting
similar to those considered in [1] then a conspiracy attack is possible, that involves
collusion of the seller S and the watermark certification authority WCA, or collusion
between the buyer B and the WCA. In more detail, for the first case: Although S
on his own is unable to determine the value of the watermark W embedded into the
content bought by B, by colluding with WCA he obtains W and therefore can embed
it into any contents bought by B and frame B for illegally distributing them. For
9the second case: Since WCA is given the task of generating W , as well as the values
Epk∗
B
(W ), EpkWCA(W ), SignskWCA(Epk∗B (W ), pk
∗
B , Signsk∗BARG)) − possibly used
by S during the identification and arbitration protocol to identify a guilty buyer who
distributes his bought copies illegally − then B can collude with the WCA to have a
random watermark W generated that is not connected to B so that B would not be
found guilty by the arbiter.
5.2 Non-Resistance to Piracy Tracing
Both the Zhang et al. and Lei et al. protocols do not require watermarking schemes
with linearity property because by design they do not make use of a secret random
permutation σ chosen by S and which is unknown to B.
What is intriguing is that the use of this would have protected the Zhang et al.
protocol from our attack in Section III. In contrast, for the Lei et al. protocol it is
possible to resist our attack even without the secret random permutation because
there is an option (stated en passant by Lei et al. in [16]) to not have the entire X ′
sent but only a profile describing it. If this option is enforced, our attack will not apply.
The main problem why the Zhang et al. protocol falls to our attack is that while
the Lei et al. protocol keeps B’s watermark unknown to him, in contrast the Zhang et
al. protocol allows B to choose the part of the watermark, i.e. SECB that uniquely
binds B to a content. The other part of the watermark, i.e. SECS does not do so.
To summarise, it does not matter how many parts are used to form the embedded
watermark W , nor that not all parts are known to B. What matters is that the parts
that bind B to the content must be unknown to B.
6 Conclusion
It is a nice idea to use secret sharing to solve both the problem of seller’s and buyer’s
rights by distributing the secret shares of the watermark between both parties. How-
ever, if the embedding operation and the operator used to combine the shares are
commutative, and further if the part of the watermark that binds B to the content is
known to B, then it leads to our attack described above.
We do not see any way to fix the Zhang et al. protocol to still provide piracy
tracing without eliminating its simplicity and basic structure. We remark that this
is yet another example where an “improved” variant i.e. [25] is insecure while the
predecessor i.e. [16] is not.
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